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NOTES & COMMENTS
THE RECONCILIATION OF LAND USE LAWS AND
THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL: TOWARD A REALISTIC
STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
In the nearly fifty years which have passed since the Supreme
Court sustained the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance in Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,' courts have generally exhibited a
high degree of deference to the judgment of municipal goirernments
in employing a due process test based upon rationality for the deter-
mination of the validity of local land use laws.2 In contrast to the type
of ordinance before the Court in Euclid, land use enactments have
in recent years reflected increasing concern over uncontrolled growth
and alarm at real or imagined deterioration in the quality of life.3
Together with more traditional motivations,' these concerns have
1272 U.S. 365 (1926).
2See, e.g., Feiler, Zoning: A Guide to Judicial Review, 47 J. URBAN LAW 319 (1969),
and notes 15-28 and accompanying text infra.
3See generally, e.g., CITIZEN'S COMM. ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THE USE OF
LAND: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO URBAN GROWTH (1973); Alonso, Urban Zero Population
Growth, Fall 1973 DAEDALUS 191; Marks and Taber, Prospects for Regional Planning
in California, 4 PAC. L.J 117 (1973); Heyman, Innovative Land Regulations and Com-
prehensive Planning, 13 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 183 (1972). As one writer has stated:
In fact, uncontrolled growth is already depeting the world's natu-
ral resources. Prime agricultural soils, ground water, fuels, and wild
life are suffering from depletion, pollution and waste caused by over-
zealous economic development. The inadequacies of urban housing,
waste disposal and transportation reflect a pattern of life whiph is
becoming congested and increasingly difficult to govern. In reality, the
unrestrained growth in certain areas is lowering the quality of life for
all people.
Comment, The Population Density Crisis, 10 CAL. WESTERN L. REV. 147 (1973). For
an accurate and alarming study on a related subject of great topical concern, see
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, UNDERSTANDING THE NATIONAL EN-
ERGY DILEMMA (1973) (Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 73-87420).
'The Supreme Court has discussed the proper purposes of such enactments:
Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and
order-these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the tradi-
tional application of the police power to municipal affairs. Yet they
merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit it. ...
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. ...
The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as
well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine
that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious
as well as clean, well balanced as well as carefully patrolled.
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954).
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generated a myriad of innovative techniques by which local govern-
ments have endeavored to control, accommodate, and even limit
growth.5 During this same period the United States has experienced
rapid population growth and substantial increases in population
mobility. These developments have revealed the need for a standard
of judicial scrutiny for land use ordinances capable of reconciling the
interests of a highly mobile population with those of landowners and
municipalities. However, from the numerous challenges to the consti-
tutionality of growth control or land use laws,' no readily ascertaina-
ble and realistic standard of judicial review has yet clearly emerged.7
In the recent decision of Construction Industry Association v. City
of Petaluma,I the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California broke sharply with the traditional rationality anal-
ysis and held a municipal land use ordinance9 unconstitutional on the
Less admirable considerations, most notably the exclusion of various racial and
socioeconomic classes, have also influenced land use laws. See, e.g., Sager, Tight Little
Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767
(1969).
'The National Association of Counties includes the following on its list of "Land
Use Techniques and Tools": "Phased Growth Time Sequenced Zoning"; "Interim
Controls"; "Population Limits"; "Land Banking"; "Transferable Development
Rights"; "Environmental Impact Statements"; "Development Moratoria"; "Land
Use/Master Plan"; and, "Intergovernmental Planning Agreement." City or area gov-
ernments employing one or more of these techniques include Fairfax County, Virginia;
Ramapo, New York; Suffolk County, New York; Pinnelas County, Florida; Boca Ra-
ton, Florida; Madison Township, New Jersey; Prince Georges County, Maryland; San-
bornton, New Hampshire; Boulder, Colorado. National Ass'n of Counties, Discussion
Draft-Land Use Proposal (1973) (on file, Washington and Lee Law Review).
'In this article the term "land use" will be used generically to describe the various
statutory methods through which communities seek to plan for and accommodate
growth in an orderly manner. The scope of such laws, of course, often extends well
beyond the realm of land use per se. See note 5 supra.
7Zoning litigation seems to have become established as an area of
jurisprudence in which obscurity of thought is almost a way of life.
'Typically challengers merely fire a shotgun barrage of constitutional
challenges from the hip and the courts have responded in kind....
[T]here seems to be no clearly articulated rationale of how we arrived
at where we are and where we are going from here.
•Feiler, Zoning: A Guide to Judicial Review, 47 J. URBAN LAW 319, 342 (1969).
'No. C-73 663 (N.D. Cal., April 26, 1974).
'Petaluma, California, was a relatively small town until the end of the 1960's.
During the first two years of this decade, however, Petaluma's residential growth rate
increased markedly, reflecting the city's "transition from a relatively isolated small
town into a suburb in the gravitational field of the San Francisco metropolitan region."
Plaintiff's Trial Brief at 2, Construction Industry Ass'n v. Petaluma, No. C-73 663
(N.D. Cal., April 26, 1974). "In 1969, 424 homes were completed in the city. In 1970,
the rate increased to 645 homes and in 1971 to 880 homes. During 1970 and 1971, the
city approved planning for approximately 2000 housing units .... " Id. at 1. Petal-
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ground that it infringed the fundamental right to travel and had not
been justified by the municipality as being necessary to the achieve-
ment of a compelling state interest.'" The Petaluma case marks the
first time that a court has employed the right-to-travel compelling-
state-interest rationale in a land use context." Prior to Petaluma,
utilization of that approach had been confined almost exclusively to
the many durational residency requirement cases spawned by such
decisions as Shapiro v. Thompson
2 and Dunn v. Blumstein.3
Of the many cases in which local land use ordinances have been
tested, none harbors such potentially sweeping implications for the
future as Petaluma." The decision raises important questions in an
area of the law currently fraught with doctrinal uncertainty: whether
the Shapiro line of cases furnishes the proper standard for judicial
review of challenges to land use laws, and if not, whether there is a
standard of review for such laws within the due process clause which
adequately and pragmatically reconciles the competing interests in
this area.
Background: The Decline of the "Old" Due Process Standard
In an opinion handed down slightly more than a year after Euclid,
the Supreme Court in Nectow v. City of Cambridge'" invalidated a
zoning ordinance.'" Hinting that the rationality test would be a rela-
uma perceived this transition as threatening to destroy its small town character and
place intolerable burdens on its public facilties and in 1971 responded by imposing a
moratorium on housing construction. The moratorium was successful. "In 1972, only
120 homes were constructed in the city." Id. The city then questioned its citizens as
to their preferences regarding growth policy and from the conferences which ensued
there emerged a complex growth control plan. The central feature of the ordinance was
designed to impede growth on lands immediately surrounding the city. Id. at 1, 18;
The Washington Post, Feb. 11, 1974, § A, at 2, col. 1; TIME, Feb. 18, 1974, at 84-85.
"While refusing to accept the city's argument that avoiding overburdening of
municipal services constitutes a compelling state interest, the judge noted that
"[sluch a measure might be warranted ... if services were so overloaded as to cause
a critical situation." He stated that Petaluma had developed the ordinance not to
alleviate a critical situation, but in "hindsight." BNA HousiNG & DEv. REP. NEws (No.
19) at A-1 (1974).
"The Washington Post, Feb. 11, 1974, § A, at 2, col. 1; TiME, Feb. 18, 1974, at
85.
'"394 U.S. 618 (1969).
"3405 U.S. 330 (1972).
"See, e.g., TMIE, Feb. 18, 1974, at 84-85; Comment, The Right to Travel and Its
Application to Restrictive Housing Laws, 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 635 (1971).
"277 U.S. 183 (1928).
6A zoning ordinance which reduced the commercial value of private land by
including it in a district reserved for residential use was found unconstitutional be-
1974]
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tively demanding standard of review, the Court noted that "[t]he
governmental power to interfere . with the general rights of the
land owner by restricting the character of his use, is not unlimited,
and . . . cannot be imposed if it does not bear a substantial
relation ' 17 to a legitimate end. For decades following Euclid and
Nectow, however, there was an almost universally accepted due pro-
cess standard which, although grounded in the same language as the
Nectow test, was much weaker in practice. Under the standard a
police power 8 enactment would be upheld unless it were shown to be
"clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation-
ship to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare. '"'9 The
legitimate ends of land use laws were encompassed in the terms
"public health, safety, morals or general welfare,"2 and any police
power regulation which bore a conceivably rational relationship to
one or more of these permissible ends was upheld under this due
process "rationality" standard.2 '
The test has been applied in such cases as Vickers v. Township
Committee,2  where the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a
township in the throes of urban expansion could use its zoning power
cause it did not promote "the health, safety, convenience and general welfare of the
inhabitants of the part of the city affected .... " Id. at 188.
'Id. (emphasis added). The Court here relied on language in the Euclid opinion.
See text accompanying note 19 infra. In Nectow the standard of review was more
demanding, it appears, because the Court chose to emphasize the word "substantial"
in the Euclid test. Unfortunately, courts turned away from Nectow's insistence on
substantial rationality, and instead routinely upheld zoning and other land use laws
unless they were shown to be "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable." The language of
Euclid would seem subject to either interpretation, and whatever relatively strict
standard appeared in Nectow was lost in subsequent decisions.
"The police power is reserved to the states under the tenth amendment to the
United States Constitution. Arbitrary or unreasonable enactments may be invalidated
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, if not rationally related to
the achievement of some legitimate governmental interest. See, e.g., Board of County
Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959); Mansfield & Swett, Inc. v.
West Orange, 120 N.J.L. 145, 198 A. 225 (1938).
"Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). See also Nectow
v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928).
2id. See note 4 supra.
","If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debat-
able, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control." Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926), citing Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 294
(1924). A comparable standard is that of "minimal scrutiny" in equal protection cases:
"The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. . . . A statutory discrim-
ination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify
it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
-37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962).
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to exclude all trailer camps from its borders. The Vickers decision
noted that "[t]he role of the judiciary in reviewing zoning ordi-
nances adopted pursuant to the statutory grant of power is narrow.
The court. . . may act only if the presumption in favor of the valid-
ity of the ordinance is overcome by an affirmative showing that it is
unreasonable or arbitrary. 2 3 Under this standard of review, laws ex-
cluding apartment buildings24 and trailer parks2 or establishing
jurisdiction-wide minimum floor space26 and lot sizes requirements
have been routinely upheld. Moreover, such enactments have been
upheld even though their exclusionary purposes, which would be con-
demned by courts today, were but thinly veiled or even admitted2
Language in some of these early opinions indicates at least hesi-
tant recognition by the courts that the "presumed rationality" ap-
proach does not provide a sufficient judicial deterrent to those munic-
ipal governments which seek to avoid the burdens and responsibili-
ties of growth through use of the police power.29 However, even when
the courts have intimated a higher standard of review for laws which
have exclusionary effects, the degree of scrutiny actually applied has
fallen short of that enunciated.2 These weaknesses in the presumed
2181 A.2d at 134.
21E.g., Fanale v. Hasbrouck Heights, 26 N.J. 320, 139 A.2d 749 (1958) (zoning
ordinance which prohibited construction of apartment houses anywhere in borough
upheld).
nE.g., Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962).
2E.g., Dundee Realty Co. v. City of Omaha, 144 Neb. 448, 13 N.W.2d 634 (1944);
Lionshead Lake v. Wayne Township, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952).
27E.g., Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942); Fischer
v. Bedminster Township, 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952) (5 acres, 40 miles from New
York City).
""If some such requirements were not imposed there would be grave danger...
of the erection of shanties which would deteriorate land values generally to the great
detriment of the increasing number of people who live in Wayne Township the year
round." Lionshead Lake v. Wayne Township, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693, 698 (1952).
""It is not meant by this, however, to exclude the possibility of cases where the
general public interest would so far outweigh the interest of the municipality that the
municipality would not be allowed to stand in the way." Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926). "It must, of course, be borne in mind that an
ordinance which is reasonable today may at some future time by reason of changed
conditions prove to be unreasonable." Fischer v. Bedminster Township, 11 N.J. 194,
93 A.2d 378, 384 (1952).
"See Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1943). In Town
of Needham a one-acre minimum lot size was upheld, in spite of a steady demand for
modest homes and an absence of evidence relating to water and sewer services or other
factors which might have justified the regulation. Although its deference to the police
power was complete, the court had set forth a seemingly higher standard with a now
familiar theme:
1974]
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rationality standard were recognized by the dissent in Vickers, which
pointed out that "[t]he import of the holding gives almost boundless
freedom to developing municipalities to erect exclusionary walls on
their boundaries, according to local whim or selfish desire .... ,,31
Stating that isolationism should not be a permissible end of land use
laws,312 the dissenting opinion suggested that "regulation rather than
prohibition [of particular uses] is the appropriate technique for at-
taining a balanced and attractive community."
The dissent in Vickers accurately foreshadowed the reasoning of
courts which recently have abandoned the presumed rationality stan-
dard in favor of a more demanding level of scrutiny for review of land
use laws. In National Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn,31 for example,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court employed a "heightened rational-
ity" test to invalidate an ordinance requiring a minimum lot size of
four acres. In National Land, as in Vickers, a locality in the path of
urban expansion sought to avoid the responsibilities which accom-
pany population growth. However, the National Land court reached
an opposite judicial result from that in Vickers and also enunciated
a different standard of review . 3 Although the plaintiffs in National
Land were landowners asserting only that the ordinance unreasona-
bly abridged their property rights, the court nonetheless included
within the scope of its review the rationality of the ordinance with
respect to the interests of future as well as current residents and
landowners26 The supreme court concluded that a local government
may employ land development laws to "insure that the municipal
services which the community requires are provided in an orderly and
rational manner,"37 but may not use such laws to halt or divert "the
A zoning by-law cannot be adopted for the purpose of setting up a
barrier against the influx of... citizens who desire to live there and
who are able and willing to erect homes upon which fair and reasona-
ble restrictions have been imposed nor for the purpose of protecting
the large estates that are already located in the district. The strictly
local interests of the town must yield if it appears that they are plainly
in conflict with the general interests of the public at large ....
42 N.E.2d at 519 (emphasis added).
1'181 A.2d at 140.
3"Id. at 145.
3I. at 147.
1'419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
5For a case following National Land and with facts displaying an even greater
similarity to those in Vickers, see Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970)
(zoning scheme which failed to provide for apartments found unconstitutional).
11215 A.2d at 612.
31d.
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natural forces which send our growing population into hitherto unde-
veloped areas in search of a comfortable place to live."38
The embryonic "heightened rationality" standard of National
Land seemed to portend the development of a framework for judicial
review within which the competing interests of local land use plan-
ning and the freedom to migrate and settle might be satisfactorily
reconciled. 9 The emerging stand appeared to employ a more strin-
gent due process test capable of protecting the interests of future
residents as well as those of landowners and municipalities."0 How-
ever, except in cases involving laws which were clearly exclusionary,"
the heightened rationality standard would require a careful and com-
plex balancing analysis to determine whether a given land use plan
substantially furthered the achievement of a legitimate end without
unreasonably burdening protected rights and interests.
42
With the heightened rationality standard not fully delineated by
the courts, some commentators viewed the right-to-travel
compelling-state-interest doctrine of Shapiro v. Thompson 3 as pro-
viding an established and easily manageable standard of review
which might be applied to land use regulations.4 Employing that
doctrine, which requires a two-tiered equal protection analysis,45 a
court would first determine whether the ordinance created a classifi-
cation which penalizes the fundamental right to migrate and settle.
To sustain a law found to penalize the exercise of that fundamental
right, the municipality would have to show that the law was neces-
=Id.
"See generally, e.g., Comment, The Pennsylvania Supreme Court and Exclusion-
ary Suburban Zoning: From Bilbar to Girsh-A Decade of Change, 16 VILL. L. REV.
507 (1971); Comment, 32 U. Pirr. L. REv. 83 (1970); Comment, 25 VAND. L. REv. 466
(1972).
"For a detailed discussion of this emerging standard, see notes 112-50 and accom-
panying text infra.
"See, e.g., Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
"See, e.g., Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir.
1972); Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291,
334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
3394 U.S. 618 (1969).
"See, e.g., Comment, Municipal Government Attempts to Curtail Growth May
Violate Right to Travel, 60 GEo. L.J. 1363 (1972); Comment, The Right to Travel and
Its Application to Restrictive Housing Laws, 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 635 (1971); Comment,
Zoning: Closing the Economic Gap, 43 TEMP. L.Q. 347 (1970); Comment, The Right
to Travel: Another Standard for Local Land Use Regulations? 39 U. CHI. L. Rzv. 612
(1972).
"3See Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065
(1969).
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sary to the achievement of a compelling state interest." As a practical
matter, few such laws could survive if subjected to this test.4 7
In Construction Industry Association v. City of Petaluma,"5 the
compelling state interest test was used for the first time to invalidate
a land use ordinance on the basis that the law infringed the funda-
mental right to travel of future residents.49 However, comparison of
Petaluma's growth control scheme with comprehensive planning or-
dinances which have survived a more moderate standard of judicial
scrutiny indicates that the Petaluma law might not have withstood
a less stringent standard, much less the extremely harsh compelling
state interest test. In Golden v. Planning Board of Town of Ramapo, 5
for example, the Court of Appeals of New York found that the town
was not seeking to turn back prior and expected population growth
rates, but to phase them into a master plan for facilities that was
specifically tied to demographic trends.5' Petaluma, on the other
hand, chose an arbitrary rate of growth to preserve its "small town
character," without a present or future commitment to accept growth
at regionally prevailing rates.52 Even though the result may have been
proper in Petaluma, general application of the Shapiro travel analysis
"Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
"In Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), a law which, during a state
of war and as a safeguard against espionage and sabotage, directed the exclusion from
West Coast areas of all persons of Japanese ancestry was found justified by a compel-
ling state interest. This major case, in which a compelling interest was found, gives
credence to the assertion that invocation of the test is tantamount to invalidation of
the law being reviewed, for few governmental interests seem compelling when mea-
sured against the extraordinary restrictions on freedom which may be required during
wartime. Although two laws reviewed under the Shapiro standard have been found to
meet the compelling state interest test, the cases involved do not significantly detract
from that test's status as a "bludgeon," as they are among a large number of cases in
which courts have resorted to fairly tortured logic in order to save reasonable laws from
the broad sweep of Shapiro. Compare Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J.
1972) and Hadnott v. Amos, 320 F. Supp. 107 (M.D. Ala. 1970), afl'd, 401 U.S. 968
(1971) with, e.g., Ector v. City of Torrence, 10 Cal. 3d 129, 514 P.2d 433, 109 Cal. Rptr.
849 (1973). While the oral opinion of the court in Petaluma noted that a compelling
state interest "might" exist if municipal services "were so overloaded as to cause a
critical situation," see note 10 supra, this offers little solace to localities desiring to
make statutory provisions for orderly growth, as sound planning is seldom achieved
through a "crisis management" approach to municipal government.
"No. C-73 663 (N.D. Cal., April 26, 1974).
"TiaME, Feb. 18, 1974, at 85.
-30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 490 U.S.
1003 (1972).
51See 30 N.Y.2d at 366, 371, 374-80, 285 N.E.2d at 294, 297, 299-303, 334 N.Y.S.2d
at 142, 146, 148-53.
52See note 2 supra.
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with its concomitant compelling state interest test in judicial review
of land use regulations could have far-reaching, undesirable conse-
quences.53 Thus, the sweeping implications of the Petaluma decision
raise the significant issue of whether Shapiro furnishes the courts
with a proper standard for judicial review of land use laws. An exami-
nation of Shapiro and its successors provides a tentative answer to
this inquiry.
Shapiro v. Thompson and the Right to Travel: A New Catalyst for
the Compelling State Interest Test
Freedom of physical movement,54 which lies at the core of the
fundamental right to travel recognized in Shapiro, has for centuries
been an elementary part of the concept of "personal liberty."55 The
Articles of Confederation guaranteed that "the people of each state
shall have free ingress and egress to and from any other state"; 6 and,
although freedom of movement is not specifically mentioned in the
Constitution, its status as a constitutionally protected right has never
been questioned.57 In searching for the constitutional sources of the
right to travel, courts have variously ascribed it to the privileges and
0"The builders' lawyer admitted ... that 'if the court defines and protects the
right to migrate and settle as a fundamental liberty, few local land use regulations are
likely to survive in their present form.'" TIME, Feb. 18, 1974, at 85. Agreeing with this
prediction, one writer advocating the right to travel approach has magnanimously
conceded that "[b]lanket decrees invalidating all local land use regulations should
be avoided . . . ." Comment, The Right to Travel: Another Standard for Local Land
Use Regulations?, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 612, 637 (1972).
5""Next to personal security, the law of England regards, asserts, and preserves the
personal liberty of individuals. This personal liberty consists in the power of loco-
motion, . . . or removing one's person to whatsoever place one's own inclination may
direct; without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law." 1 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES *134 (emphasis added).
="Undoubtedly the right of locomotion, the right to remove from one place to
another according to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty . . ." Williams
v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900); accord, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78,
97 (1908). For a readable and scholarly discussion of the historical and constitutional
status of the freedom of movement, see Z. CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
CONSTITUTION 162-213 (1956).
"ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IV.
'7See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969); United States v. Guest,
383 U.S. 745, 757-59 (1966); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 517 (1964);
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35,
44 (1868); Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 122, 221 (1848); Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F.
Cas. 546, 551-52 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). For a discussion of the development
of the right to travel under the Constitution, see Vestal, Freedom of Movement, 41
IowA L. REV. 6 (1955).
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immunities clauses,"5 the guarantee of freedom to petition the govern-
ment, 9 the commerce clause,"0 and the due process clause of the fifth
amendment." Many recent cases dealing with the right to travel have
followed the lead of United States v. Guest, 2 in which the right was
regarded as an unwritten premise or necessary implication of the
Constitution, occupying "a position fundamental to the concept of
our Federal Union." By employing this formulation in Shapiro v.
"See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 285 (1970) (Stewart, J., concurring
and dissenting); New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1959); United States v. Wheeler,
254 U.S. 281, 293 (1920); Traux v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39 (1915); Ward v. Maryland,
79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1871); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868);
Lemmon v. The People, 20 N.Y. 562, 610 (1860). The germinal language connecting
freedom of movement to the privileges and immunities of national citizenship is found
in the famous case of Corfield v. Coryell. "We feel no hesitation in confining these
expressions to those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamen-
tal . . . .The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other
state . . . may be mentioned as [one] of the particular privileges and immunities of
citizens, which [is] clearly embraced by the general description of privileges deemed
-to be fundamental ..... Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (No. 3230)
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
"Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 (1868); Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 122, 221 (1848).
"Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941), is the leading case. Numerous cases
have noted that the commerce power encompasses the movement of persons as well
as of commodities in interstate commerce. United States v. Hill, 248 U.S. 420, 423
(1919); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308,320 (1913); Covington & Cincinnati Bridge
Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204, 218-19 (1894); Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania,
114 U.S. 196, 203 (1885). Additionally, Congress may legislate to protect against viola-
tions of civil rights where those violations infringe on the free movement of individuals
in interstate commerce. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454
(1960); Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950); Mitchell v. United States,
313 U.S. 80 (1941).
"Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 514-17 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 116, 129 (1958); Z. CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION 192-93
(1956). See also Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445, 450 (D.D.C. 1952) (passport
denial); Ebel v. Drum, 52 F. Supp. 189 (D. Mass. 1943) (exclusion from "military
areas"). Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-30 (1969).
62383 U.S. 745 (1966).
11383 U.S. at 757. The Court went on to say that the "right finds no explicit
mention in the Constitution. The reason, it has been suggested, is that a right so
elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the
stronger Union the Constitution created. In any event, freedom to travel throughout
the United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution."
Id. at 758. Accord, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971); Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618, 629-30 (1969). In ascribing the right to travel to the Constitution
the Shapiro Court relied on United States v. Guest, and Shapiro is no doubt responsi-
ble for the almost unanimous acceptance of that proposition in the myriad of residency
requirement cases which have followed.
It is worthy of note that the peculiar facts of Guest made the textual source of
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Thompson,4 the Supreme Court was able, in reviewing fact situa-
tions presenting equal protection issues, to scrutinize alleged in-
fringements of the right to travel without reference to that right's
traditional textual sources. 5 In Shapiro the Court established that
the basic constitutional freedom of movement includes the right to
migrate and settle,6 and unveiled a new standard for reviewing cer-
tain laws found to penalize this fundamental right.
Shapiro consolidated three appeals from three-judge district
courts,6" all concerning challenges to statutory provisions establishing
durational residency requirements for the receipt of welfare pay-
ments. In each case such payments had been denied to residents of
the particular jurisdiction who, although eligible in other respects,
had not fulfilled a one-year durational residency requirement prior to
applying for assistance." Such a requirement, the Court found, sin-
gled out as a class those indigents who had exercised their right to
migrate and settle within the past year, and denied to such class "the
very means to subsist-food, shelter, and other necessities of life." 9
The Court held that the state could achieve its aims through such
"invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens" 0 only if the
classification was justified by a compelling state interest, because the
classification drawn by the statute trenches upon a fundamental
right."
Therefore, the durational residency requirements were ostensibly
found to violate the equal protection clause not because they irration-
the right to travel irrelevant to the outcome of that case, as the Court was not reviewing
any statute claimed to infringe upon the right. Guest involved the federal civil rights
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 241, which makes a conspiracy to interfere with a citizen's exercise
of any right secured to him by the Constitution a criminal offense. There the Court
needed to decide only that the right to travel freely from one state- to another was in
fact secured by the Constitution; the precise source of that right within the Constitu-
tion was not of crucial importance. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966).
14394 U.S. 618 (1969).
"Notes 58-63 and accompanying text supra.
"This view of the right to travel, as including the right to migrate and settle, has
received confirmation in a very recent Supreme Court opinion. See Memorial Hosp.
v. Maricopa County,'415 U.S. 250, 94 S. Ct. 1078, 1080 (1974).
"The three-judge court is authorized by 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281-84 (1970).
u394 U.S. at 621-22.
"Id. at 627.
'Id. at 633.
"See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 438 (1963); Note, Shapiro v. Thompson: Travel, Welfare, and the Constitution,
44 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 989, 997 (1969).
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ally" or invidiously" discriminated against a class consisting of indi-
gents, but because the classification drawn by the statute worked to
penalize the right to travel.7 4 Subsequently, in invalidating a one-year
durational residency requirement for voting in Dunn v. Blumstein,
7
the Court stated that Shapiro requires invocation of the compelling
state interest test whenever a law "penalizes" the travel right, regard-
less of whether or not the exercise of the right is actually "deterred.""6
Hence, the Court implied that statutory injury to the exercise of the
right to travel in the abstract sense, as opposed to actual injury, is
sufficient to trigger the harsher standard of review.
The holdings in Shapiro and Dunn directly imply that all dura-
tional residency laws are subject to the strict standard of scrutiny
since all such laws "impermissibly . . . penalize the right to travel
by imposing their prohibitions on only those persons who have re-
cently exercised that right."" However, dicta in the opinions indicate
that the penalization of travel must be viewed in conjunction with the
benefit or protected interest which a statute has denied to those who
have exercised their right to travel. 78 In an often quoted footnote, the
Court in Shapiro seemed to eschew the implication of its holding that
penalization of travel, without regard for the underlying benefit or
7 "Irrationality" would be the basis for invalidation of a law under the traditional
or "minimal scrutiny" equal protection standard. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420 (1961).
"Discrimination against a suspect class is usually termed "invidious," and such
discrimination generally invites application of the almost invariably fatal compelling
state interest test. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969), where the Court
refers to discrimination against a class of welfare recipients as "invidious," and yet
purports to invoke the compelling state interest test there not because wealth is a
suspect class or welfare benefits a fundamental right, but because the right to travel
has been infringed.
71394 U.S. at 634-38.
5405 U.S. 330 (1972) (durational residency requirement for voting invalidated
under the compelling state interest test; right to travel and right to vote each found
sufficient to trigger application of strict standard).
7 See 405 U.S. at 339-42, explaining that actual deterrence of the right to travel is
not necessary to trigger the compelling state interest standard of review.
77Id. at 342. Cf. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), where the Court
refused to invoke strict scrutiny where there was no conflation of the denial of welfare
payments with a "fundamental" right such as travel. Id. at 484 n.16. Dandridge may
be seen as reinforcing the treatment of travel as a categorical imperative in equal
protection contexts, but this view is weakened by the fact that the deprivation of
welfare involved was minimal. The case simply did not possess those qualities of
unfairness which spurred the use of the compelling interest test in Shapiro.
"sSee Note, Snob Zoning: Must a Man's Home be a Castle?, 69 MICH. L. REv. 339,
347 (1970); Note, Shapiro v. Thompson: Travel, Welfare, and the Constitution, 44
N.Y.U.L. REV. 989, 1003 (1969).
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right involved, was sufficient reason to invoke the compelling state
interest test:
We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or
residence requirements determining eligibility to vote, eligibil-
ity for tuition-free education, -to obtain a license to practice a
profession, to hunt or fish, and so forth. Such requirements
may promote compelling state interests on the one hand, or,
on the other, may not be penalties upon the exercise of the
constitutional right of interstate travel. 9
In thus qualifying a holding which would have appeared to doom all
durational residency requirements, the Court seemed to imply that
application of the travel-keyed equal protection doctrine "may de-
pend upon the nature of the benefit that the state is providing to
some while withholding from others.""
In line with this approach, cases following Shapiro have consis-
tently applied the compelling state interest test to durational resi-
dency requirements only where the statutory classification has de-
prived those who exercised their right to travel of some right or ne-
cessity." It appears, however, that conditioning of a benefit not con-
sidered to be a necessary governmental benefit does not constitute a
"penalty" on travel. Indeed, in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa
7394 U.S. at 638 n.21.
"Walker v. Yucht, 352 F. Supp. 85, 94 (D. Del. 1972).
"See, e.g., Cole v. Housing Auth., 435 F.2d 807, 811 n.12 (1st Cir. 1970).
For cases involving denial of welfare payments, see, e.g., Demiraugh v. DeVos, 476
F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1973); Rivera v. Dunn, 329 F. Supp. 554 (D. Conn. 1971).
For cases involving denial of free medical care, see e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Mari-
copa County, 415 U.S. 250, 94 S. Ct. 1078 (1974); Vaughan v. Bower, 313 F. Supp.
37 (D. Ariz.), aff'd, 400 U.S. 884 (1970); Valenciano v. Bateman, 323 F. Supp. 600 (D.
Ariz. 1971); Crapps v. Duval County Hosp. Auth., 314 F. Supp. 181 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
But cf. Diaz v. Weinburger, 361 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (alien eligibility residency
requirement for medical care held unconstitutional under due process rationality stan-
dards).
For cases involving denial of admission to public housing, see, e.g., Cole v. Hous-
ing Auth., 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970); King v. New Rochelle Housing Auth., 314 F.
Supp. 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). But cf. Lane v. McGarry, 320 F. Supp. 562 (N.D.N.Y.
1970) (effect of residency requirement on right to travel found insubstantial because
restricted to one locality). The majority view holds that localities as well as states
cannot penalize the right to migrate and settle. Cole, supra. Cf. National Land & Inv.
Co. v. Kohn, 215 A.2d 597, 612 (1966).
For cases involving denial of the right to vote pending fulfillment of a durational
residency requirement, see, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Keppel v.
Donovan, 326 F. Supp. 15 (D. Minn. 1970); Burg v. Canniffe, 315 F. Supp. 380 (D.
Mass. 1970). But see Prigmore v. Renfro,'356 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ala. 1972) (failure to
provide right to absentee ballot does not penalize travel because it applies to all
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County,82 the Supreme Court has recently concluded that "the right
of interstate travel must be seen as insuring new residents the same
right to vital government benefits and privileges in the States to
which they migrate as are [sic] enjoyed by other residents.", Thus,
the results in cases involving residency requirements for low tuition
rates,84 municipal employment,81 legislative and judicial office hold-
ing,"' professional licenses s8 and divorce decrees" have been signifi-
cantly different from those in cases involving voting and various wel-
fare benefits. 9 This development in the cases is a clear indication
that the nature of the benefit or privilege conditioned by the classifi-
cation may determine the test to be used, and thus, in most instan-
ces, the outcome of the case."
qualified voters who do not vote, whether for travel or other reasons).
The cases conform to the view that the "right to travel," as employed in residency
requirement cases, generally refers to the migration and settlement aspects of travel
and includes intrastate as well as interstate travel. Cole, supra, at 811. See also King
v. New Rochelle Housing Auth., 314 F. Supp. 427, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
-415 U.S. 250, 94 S. Ct. 1078 (1974).
11Id. at 261, 94 S. Ct. at 1084 (emphasis added). Clearly, such interests as welfare
payments, free medical care, and voting could be termed "vital government benefits
and privileges."
'See, e.g., Weaver v. Kelton, 357 F. Supp. 1106 (E.D. Tex. 1973); Starns v.
Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 985 (1971); Kirk v. Board
of Regents, 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S.
554 (1970). But cf. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
'See, e.g., Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1972); Ector v. City of
Torrence, 10 Cal.3d 129, 514 P.2d 433, 109 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1973).
"See, e.g., Walker v. Yucht, 352 F. Supp. 85 (D. Del. 1972) (residency requirement
for state legislative candidates); Hadnott v. Amos, 320 F. Supp. 107 (M.D. Ala. 1970),
aff'd, 401 U.S. 968 (1971) (compelling state interests justify durational residency re-
quirement for judges).
sISee, e.g., Kline v. Rankin, 352 F. Supp. 292, 295 (N.D. Miss. 1972): "... Dunn
cannot be construed to enunciate the principle that a residency requirement of any
character infringes the fundamental right of citizens to travel interstate; rather, in
Dunn the Supreme Court merely extended its reasoning in Shapiro to voter residency
requirements. . . .Thus, the application of the 'rational connection' test . . . was
appropriate in light of Shapiro and is no less appropriate since Dunn." Suffling v.
Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257 (D.N.M. 1972). But see Keenan v, Board of Law Examin-
ers, 317 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970).
"Compare Sosna v. Iowa, 360 F. Supp. 1182, 1184 (N.D. Iowa 1973), prob. juris.
noted, 415 U.S. 911, 94 S. Ct. 1405 (1974) ("Unlike voting or welfare, the concept of
divorce is not a constitutional right, nor is it a basic necessity to survival."), with
Larsen v. Gallogly, 361 F. Supp. 305 (D.R.I. 1973) (two-year residency requirement for
divorce denies equal protection by penalizing right to travel and abridges due process
by denying access to courts) and Monroe v. Monroe, 32 Ohio Misc. 129, 289 N.E.2d
915 (1972) (one-year requirement invalidated).
"Cases cited note 81 supra.
"°For example, compare Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 354-55 (1972) (dura-
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The distinctions drawn among the various types of "benefits and
privileges" in order to avoid finding that all residency requirements
penalize travel appear to reflect a deep-seated judicial reluctance to
accept the direct logical implications to that effect of the Shapiro and
Dunn decisions.' When faced with travel-based challenges to resi-
dency requirement laws arguably not so unjust as those swept aside
in Shapiro and Dunn, it seems that the courts have begun to perceive,
and in many instances strived to avoid, the broad and seemingly
inflexible dictates of those cases.2 As one district court opinion can-
didly stated:
We set aside as untenable the thought that after Dunn all
durational residency requirements must be examined under
the compelling state interest test. . . .We are aware of very
few cases in which the compelling state interest test has been
applied and then held by a court to have been satisfied. It is
becoming increasingly clear that the mere application of this
. .test condemns state practices that, although not without
merit, simply cannot withstand the heavy burden required for
justification. 3
The court concluded that such a blanket imposition of the stringent
tional residency requirement for voting not justified by state's interest in having an
electorate informed as to state and local issues) with Walker v. Yucht, 352 F. Supp.
85, 98 (D. Del. 1972) (durational residency requirement for state legislative candidates
justified by state interests in providing voters an opportunity to become informed as
to candidate, and in assuring that candidate is informed as to matters of interest to
state's citizenry). See also Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 286-88,
94 S. Ct. 1078, 1096-97 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"See text at note 77 supra.
"2See, e.g., Johnson v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 449 F.2d 871, 879 (2d Cir.
1971); Sosna v. Iowa, 360 F. Supp. 1182, 1184 (N.D. Iowa 1973), prob. juris noted 415
U.S. 911, 94 S. Ct. 1405 (1974); Note, The Decline and Fall of the New Equal Protec-
tion: A Polemical Approach, 58 VA. L. REv. 1489, 1496 (1972).
While at least two such statutes were found to satisfy the compelling state interest
test, the courts in those cases seemed in reality to be employing a lower standard of
review in order to save what they regarded as reasonable laws. See, e.g., Krzewinski
v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1972) (statute requiring policeman or fireman to
surrender right to travel and migrate in exchange for his job is justified by compelling
state interest in promoting identity with community among policemen and firemen,
deterrent effect on crime of having off-duty policemen in community and resulting
chance encounters and associations which might lead to invaluable sources of informa-
tion, develop community rapport, and promote understanding and tolerance); Had-
nott v. Amos, 320 F. Supp. 107 (M.D. Ala. 1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 968 (1971) (durational
residency requirement for candidates for judgeships justified by compelling state inter-
est in ensuring that electorate are familiar with total qualifications of candidates).
'3Walker v. Yucht, 352 F. Supp. 85, 96 (D. Del. 1972) (emphasis added).
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standard as was suggested by Dunn would portend "substantial alter-
ation of federal-state relationships.""4
Commentators seem to agree that this portent of "substantial
alteration of federal-state relationships" is especially accurate in the
area of land use laws and admit that extension of the Shapiro travel
doctrine to that field would mean that "few local land use regulations
are likely to survive in their present form."95 Judicial hesitancy to
extend the Shapiro doctrine is strong even within the doctrine's na-
tive, durational residency requirement context," and thus seems par-
ticularly warranted where application of that doctrine to local land
use laws is suggested. Fortunately, the Shapiro line of cases reveals
ample, if not precisely delineated, reasons why review of land use
statutes under the compelling state interest standard is neither im-
perative nor advisable.
In Shapiro and its progeny the presence of two factors has been
required for invocation of the compelling state interest test: first, the
statute must make a classification; and second, the classification
must be such that, by denying to members of the class an equal right
to some "vital" governmental benefit or privilege, it penalizes exer-
cise of the right to travel." Durational residency requirement laws in
effect make a classification because they affect "those persons, and
"Id. at 97.
5Comment, The Right to Travel: Another Constitutional Standard for Local Land
Use Regulations?, 39 U. Ci. L. REV. 612, 637 (1972). As one writer has noted, "Any
conflict bewtween state interests and federally protected individual liberties could
then be abstracted from its own former jurisprudence and hurled into the vortex of
strict compelling-state-interest review. Such an equal protection equivalent of due
process 'incorporation' would substantially alter the relationships among individuals,
state governments, and the federal juridicary." Note, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term,
86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 115 (1972). See also, e.g., Note, The Decline and Fall of the New
Equal Protection: A Polemical Approach, 58 VA. L. Rtv. 1489 (1972); Note, State
Durational Residence Requirements for Divorce: How Long Is Too Long?, 31 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 359 (1974); Comment, Municipal Government Attempts to Curtail Growth
May Violate Right to Travel, 60 GEO. L.J. 1363 (1972); Comment, The Right to Travel
and Its Application to Restrictive Housing Laws, 66 Nw. U.L. REV. 635 (1971).
"See notes 81-94 and accompanying text supra.
TSee, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 94 S. Ct. 1078
(1974). "[Tjhe right of interstate travel must be seen as insuring new residents the
same right to vital governmental benefits and privileges in the States to which they
migrate as are [sic] enjoyed by other residents .... Arizona's durational residency
requirement for free medical care penalizes indigents for exercising their right to mi-
grate to and settle in that State. Accordingly, the classification created by the resi-
dency requirement, 'unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling state inter-
est, is unconstitutional.' "Id. at 4281, citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634
(1969).
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only those persons, who have gone from one jurisdiction to another." 8
In essence, only those persons "who have exercised their constitu-
tional right of. . .' migration"99 are denied some benefit or privilege
which others enjoy. Moreover, durational residency requirements
generally affect only a single, specifically identifiable interest of the
class defined by recent travel, such as voting or welfare benefits.
Thus, the effect of the residency requirement on the single factor is
measured to determine whether there has been a penalty on travel
which will trigger the compelling state interest test. As a practical
matter the evaluation of this single factor will usually determine the
outcome of a given case. 09 Since examination of only a single factor
is required, employment of the two-tiered equal protection analysis1 '
would not seem inappropriate since the danger of its oversimplifying
or masking the analysis of multifaceted issues may be somewhat
reduced.' 2
It may not be entirely accurate to assert that because the courts
have made their decisions in the Shapiro line of cases turn upon a
single factor, the cases have been in fact uncomplicated and therefore
properly subjected to a fairly simple analytical procedure. Certainly,
there may have been other factors which should have weighed heavily
in these decisions, and it may be that there actually have been addi-
tional considerations.' 3 Indeed, some jurists and commentators have
"Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972) (emphasis added); accord, e.g.,
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 238 (1970) (opinion of Brennan, White, and Marshall,
JJ.); Prigmore v. Renfro, 356 F. Supp. 427, 432 (N.D. Ala. 1972).
"Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 238 (1970) (opinion of Brennan, White, and
Marshall, JJ.).
'*As a practical matter, determination of the level of scrutiny to be applied almost
certainly decides the outcome of the case. See Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolv-
ing Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HIv.
L. REv. 1 (1972); Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv.
1065 (1969); Note, The Decline and Fall of the New Equal Protection: A Polemical
Approach, 58 VA. L. REV. 1489 (1972).
"'For a thorough discussion of the two-tiered or "new" equal protection analysis,
see Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAv. L. REv. 1065 (1969).
1"2See generally, e.g., Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for.a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972);
Note, The Decline and Fall of the New Equal Protection: A Polemical Approach, 58
VA. L. REV. 1489 (1972).
"3As one commentator has remarked:
In fact, the Court's behavior has been more complex than this
two-dimensional analysis implies. Some questionable classifications
have been dealt the lenient "any conceivable basis" review. Others,
though ultimately sustained, were treated to a longer exposition out-
lining what there was about them that merited being called reasona-
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suggested that in residency requirement cases involving governmen-
tal benefits such as welfare and medical care, discrimination based
upon wealth has really been the crucial issue. 10 Unfortunately, the
two-tiered analysis employed in Shapiro and its successors tends to
conceal additional considerations of this nature. To the extent that
the factors to be weighed in determining the validity of a law are more
numerous and complex than those utilized in choosing the standard
of review to be employed, the fact that in practice the standard cho-
sen determines the outcome0M relieves the courts of the burden of
explaining the reasoning used in actually applying the standard of
review. Therefore, the more complex the law in terms of state inter-
ests furthered and private interests affected, the more a reflexive
invocation of the two-tiered approach will tend either to conceal the
careful weighing of the relevant considerations or to impede the very
development of legitimate problem solving techniques.' The asser-
tion that a two-tiered analysis is appropriate in the Shapiro line of
cases merely seeks to emphasize the comparative simplicity of the
considerations involved in analyzing durational residency require-
ment laws.
However, challenges to land use ordinances do not readily fit the
"Shapiro" analytical pattern, as they characteristically involve a
multiplicity of diverse interests and relationships which render them
far more complex than residency requirement cases. Unlike Shapiro
and its progeny, the various types of land use laws'07 do not make
classifications which affect only those individuals who migrate or who
wish to do so. Rather, they affect all residents, non-residents, and
future residents of all races and classes who have an "interest" in the
jurisdiction, irrespective of whether those individuals exercise their
right to travel. Furthermore, such statutory schemes do not deny a
ble. Yet other classifications have been stricken as patently unreason-
able. Thus, a few opinions have been issued lately that show the Court
utilizing a sort of cost-benefit framework ....
Lefcoe, The Public Housing Referendum Case, Zoning, and the Supreme Court, 59
CALIF. L. Rav. 1384, 1422-23 (1971) (footnotes omitted). Mr. Lefcoe's statement seems
to tacitly recognize that the two-tiered equal protection analysis may conceal the
complexities of decision making.
"4'See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 94 S. Ct. 1078,
1088-90 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring); Note, Shapiro v. Thompson: Travel, Welfare,
and the Constitution, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 989, 1003 (1969).
'05See note 100 supra.
' 0 See, e.g., Note, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HAlv. L. Rv. 1, 114-115
(1972); Note, The Decline and Fall of the New Equal Protection: A Polemical
Approach, 58 VA. L. REv. 1489, 1494-1502 (1972).
"'See note 5 supra.
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single governmental benefit or privilege, but impose degrees of regu-
lation on a variety of private interests. Thus a homeowner might find
limitations placed on: the nature of additional improvements he
could make on his property; the purposes and consequently the
amount for which the property could be sold; the area to which he
would be limited if he wished to move or construct a specific type of
residence elsewhere in the jurisdiction; the price of such a new resi-
dence; and perhaps temporarily, the availability of specific types of
housing. Presumably, the latter three of these interests would most
concern future residents, while the first two would have the greatest
impact on landowners and developers. This enumeration by no
means exhausts the relevant factors but only serves to emphasize that
controversies over land use ordinances will inavariably be highly
complex affairs, not readily susceptible to the somewhat mechanistic
equal protection analysis employed in the Shapiro line of cases." 8
Even in residency requirement cases, courts have warned against
"lumping together diverse interests"'' 9 in categorical invocation of
the compelling state interest standard, a practice which may obscure
the true rationale of a decision or leave important factors unconsi-
dered. Furthermore, that courts have regarded the compelling state
interest standard as unnecessary or inappropriate in some residency
requirement cases"0 seems a cogent argument against its use in re-
'It is recognized that some specific measures, which may make up only one part
of a complicated regulatory scheme, may seem to fit the Shapiro mold. For example,
a moratorium on extension of sewer services denies to a class (the applicants therefor)
what might be termed a governmental benefit. However, it is inescapable that there
might be legitimate state interests furthered by such a measure, and that a locality
should not be prevented from acting in good faith to solve its problems until those
problems have achieved truly crisis proportions and, therefore, under the dictates of
Petaluma, meet the compelling state interest test. See notes 10 and 47 supra. Even a
sewer moratorium affects the interests of developers and current residents as well as
those of would-be residents and, consequently, should be reviewed under a standard
which will give proper weight to these many interests. It cannot be gainsaid that, for
example, resolution of the environmental and land use problems facing Fairfax
County, Virginia, will be a far more complicated matter than determining the fairness
of a particular durational residency requirement.
Furthermore, an extension of the Shapiro doctrine to non-statutory areas of the
law related to land use would be undesirable. The impact of the Shapiro decision on
recent constructive developments in nuisance law, for instance, would be superfluous
at best and might upset evolving remedial models which clearly protect interests in
migration and settlement without disregarding other important interests. For an im-
portant example dealing with the problem of developers who "come to the nuisance,"
see Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972).
'10 Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492, 502-03 (D.N.J. 1972).
"'In at least two cases the courts invalidated residency requirements via the com-
pelling state interest standard but acknowledged that the laws in question would not
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view of land use laws, where reflexive application of such an inexora-
bly devastating test"' would pose grave dangers of oversimplifying
and obfuscating the judicial decision-making process. If further justi-
fication for eschewing use of the Shapiro doctrine in land use cases
is needed, it may be found through an examination of current trends
in the land use area, which suggests that an alternative standard is
available which will provide adequate protection for the migratory
rights of future residents without undue negative impact on other
legitimate state interests.
A Regional Concept of Rationality: An Adequate and Realistic
Standard of Review for Land Use Laws
Because land use ordinances are police power enactments, they
have historically been measured against due process standards of
rationality."' The traditional due process standard of review has had
have withstood a test demanding that they be rational in fact. Demiragh v. DeVos,
476 F.2d 403, 405 (2d Cir. 1973); Cole v. Housing Auth., 435 F.2d 807, 813 (1st Cir.
1970). Another court actually invalidated such a law under a standard demanding that
it be rationally based and free from invidious discrimination, refusing to invoke the
compelling state interest test. Diaz v. Weinburger, 361 F. Supp. 1, 9-10 (S.D. Fla.
1973). Furthermore, in some cases the statutes involved could no doubt have been
invalidated without resort to the stricter standard, see, e.g., King v. New Rochelle
Housing Auth., 314 F. Supp. 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), while in others strained logic had
to be employed to avoid invocation of the strict test and save statutes which possessed
merit but clearly "penalized" travel by the standards of Shapiro and Dunn. See, e.g.,
Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, 354 F. Supp. 126 (N.D. Ind. 1973).
"'Some commentators have assumed that private agreements, such as convenants
or neighborhood associations could accomplish the legitimate goals of land use plan-
ning if the Shapiro travel doctrine swept aside most public regulation. See, e.g., Com-
ment, The Right to Travel: Another Constitutional Standard for Local Land Use
Regulations?, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 612, 637 (1972). As one commentator has recognized
and advocated, however, if the Shapiro doctrine is extended to public land use regula-
tion, private covenants could probably be invalidated through utilization of the doc-
trine of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See Note, Snob Zoning: Must a Man's
Home be a Castle?, 69 MICH. L. REV. 339, 359 n.110 (1970). While recognizing the
desirability of eliminating racial and economic discrimination and of safeguarding the
constitutional right to migrate and settle, to attempt such a result through the destruc-
tion of virtually all public and private power to regulate land use at the local level
would be unwise.
"2See, e.g., Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 660, 107 S.E.2d
390, 395 (1959). But see Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Pro-
tection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767 (1969). Where land use laws do in fact
discriminate against a suspect class, such as one based upon race, equal protection
analysis may of course be applicable. This note merely suggests that wholesale applica-
tion of equal protection's strict scrutiny standard to all land use laws is unnecessary
and would be ill-advised.
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almost no "teeth," and has been essentially equivalent to the ration-
ality or minimal scrutiny standard employed when laws are sustained
under a two-tiered equal protection analysis.11 3 Commenting on this
equal protection approach to statutory analysis, one authority has
noted that "[a]fter the years in which the strict scrutiny-invalida-
tion and minimal scrutiny-nonintervention correlations were vir-
tually perfect, the pattern has suddenly become unsettled.1 1 4 The
emerging synthesis is a "heightened" rationality test, a standard of
review through which courts would demand compliance with a re-
cently dormant but never abandoned constitutional requirement:
that legislative means must substantially further legitimate state
interests."5 Roughly paralleling this equal protection development is
"'See notes 9-30 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of the traditional
due process standard. The minimal rationality standard employed under the equal
protection clause is explained in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
'"Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 19 (1972).
"1id. at 20. For a land use case involving equal protection issues, in which the court
refused to invoke the Shapiro travel doctrine, see Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, -
U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 1536 (1974). The circuit court in Belle Terre had employed the
heightened rationality standard discussed by Gunther, supra, to invalidate a local
ordinance which forbade habitation of single-family dwellings by more than two unre-
lated persons. 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973). The Supreme Court did not comment on
the standard of review employed by the Second Circuit and, in reversing, held that
local ordinances will be upheld if they are reasonable and bear a rational relationship
to a permissible end. - U.S. at - , 94 S. Ct. at 1540. Although the Court's
formulation of the rationality test is reminiscent of the old, deferential standard, in
articulating the test Justice Douglas cites Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), a case in
which the Court is said to have employed a "heightened" standard of rationality. See
Gunther, supra, at 32. The Court's reliance on Reed might be interpreted as an indica-
tion that a heightened rationality standard was applied in Belle Terre, with the Su-
preme Court merely reaching the opposite result from the Second Circuit. However,
the Court could employ either a minimal or a heightened standard of rationality in
future cases without being inconsistent with the language of Belle Terre.
The Court declined to invoke the compelling state interest test in Belle Terre,
dismissing the claim of interference with the right to migrate and settle with the simple
statement that the ordinance "is not aimed at transients." - U.S. at -, 94 S.
Ct. at 1540. The decision does not necessarily conflict with Petaluma, because the
ordinance involved does not seek to limit the number of new residents. The ordinance
does, however, definitely deter groups of unrelated persons from migrating into Belle
Terre and establishing households. Thus, while the Court did not decisively reject the
right-to-travel compelling-state-interest standard of review for all land use laws, it was
not called upon to do so; and refusal to apply the Shapiro rationale to the Belle Terre
ordinance would seem to indicate that the impact of Petaluma will be less than perva-
sive.
In its discussion of the permissible purposes of police power enactments, the
opinion gives further hope to those favoring the constitutionality of local ordinances
designed to achieve well-planned communities and orderly accommodation of growth.
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a trend in the due process area toward a heightened rationality stan-
dard for reviewing local actions under the police power."' The spirit
of this new due process standard has been captured in the words of
Mr. Justice Harlan: "It is a rational continuum which, broadly
speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary imposi-
tions and purposeless restraints. . . and which also recognizes, what
a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests re-
quire particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to jus-
tify their abridgment.""
7
It would seem logical for several reasons, therefore, to employ a
heightened due process standard to safeguard the right to travel of
potential residents as well as landowners. By regarding the right to
migrate and settle as a liberty protected by the due process clause,"
the fact that the landowners' "property" interests are protected by
that same clause would seem to compel a consistent standard of
review for both."' This course of action would provide a textual
Relying on Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), the Court makes it clear that, for
example, "[a] quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles
restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land use project . . . ." - U.S. at -. , 94
S. Ct. at 1541. The Court's statements concerning permissible purposes reaffirm the
propriety of aesthetic zoning (see note 148 infra) and seem to indicate that it is not
impermissible to order growth for the purpose of making a community liveable.
"'See, e.g., Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); National Land & Inv. Co. v.
Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
"'Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), quoted in Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring). Mr. Justice Harlan once
contrasted a properly invoked rationality standard to what he perceived as the excesses
of substantive equal protection:
An analysis under due process standards, correctly understood, is
• ..more conducive to judicial restraint than an approach couched
in slogans and ringing phrases, such as "suspect" classification or
"invidious" distinctions, or "compelling" state interest, that blur
analysis by shifting the focus away from the nature of the individual
interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the rationality of
the connection between legislative means and purpose, the existence
of alternative means for effectuating the purpose, and the degree of
confidence we may have that the statute reflects the legislative con-
cern for the purpose that would legitimately support the means cho-
sen.
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 260 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
"'See, e.g., Z. CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RimHTs IN THE CONSTITUTION 192-93 (1956).
"'Cf. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972): "The right to enjoy
property without unlawful deprivation, no less than the. . . right to travel, is in truth
a 'personal' right . . . .In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists between the
personal right to liberty and the personal right in property." Id. at 552 (emphasis
added). Under the heightened rationality standard of review for land use ordinances,
arbitrary exclusion of economic uses of property is regarded as harshly as arbitrary
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framework for future adjudication concerning the right to travel and
would avoid a potential problem suggested by the Petaluma deci-
sion-that if landowners should be denied standing to assert the
travel rights of potential residents, the outcome of litigation challeng-
ing land use ordinances might be dependent upon the identity of the
plaintiff.2" Furthermore, a weighing of land use ordinances against
the various interests of both residents and nonresidents, irrespective
of the identity of the challenging party, has already been done in a
significant number of cases. These opinions reveal the contours of a
heightened due process standard for review of land use laws which
relies upon an appraisal of regional interests in determining rational-
ity.
The more strict, regionally oriented rationality standard origi-
nated in decisions such as that of the Virginia Supreme Court in
Board of County Supervisors v. Carper. 1 2 In that case, which struck
down a two-acre minimum lot size requirement in the Virginia sub-
urbs of Washington, consideration of the interests of potential resi-
dents provided a strong undercurrent for the court's ruling even
exclusion of residential uses, and property owners, like future residents, will find their
rights better protected than under the old rationality standards. Compare Exton Quar-
ries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd., 425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d 169 (1967) (in absence of evidence of
harmful effects a township wide prohibition of quarrying is invalid), with Consolidated
Rock Products Co. v. Los Angeles, 57 Cal. App.2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638,
appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962) (ordinance preventing rock and gravel quarrying
is not unconstitutional even though such operations could be conducted on plaintiff's
property without appreciable pollution and noise detriment to nearby residences, or
depreciation of their property value, and even though enforcement of the ordinance
leaves plaintiff's property with no economic value). Consistent with his advocacy of a
vigorous due process standard of review, Mr. Justice Harlan urged that probable juris-
diction be noted. 371 U.S. at 36.
'"Compare Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, No. C-73 663 (N.D.
Cal., April 26, 1974), with Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Los Angeles, 57 Cal. App.
2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962). The
standing problem may not be as acute as it once would have been. There is recent
authority, apparently followed in the Petaluma decision, to the effect that if plaintiffs
can demonstrate that they have standing to assert rights resulting from an injury to
their own interest, they may likewise raise the interests of others who are not plaintiffs,
but whose interests are intimately involved in the issues of the litigation, who have
suffered injury from enforcement of the legislation in issue, who will be adequately
represented by the named plaintiffs, and who might be so dispersed that otherwise
their interests would not receive a full hearing on a vital issue of law. See Trafficante
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727 (1972); Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970); Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 457
F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972); Sisters of Providence v. City of Evanston, 335 F. Supp. 396
(N.D. fI1. 1971).
121200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959).
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though the ground given for the decision was arbitrary deprivation of
the use of property. 2 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recently
applied and further developed this regional rationality standard.
Commencing with its decision in National Land & Investment Co. v.
Kohn,'? that court has demanded that land use laws not only serve
traditionally legitimate zoning purposes but also that they rationally
provide for the accommodation of natural growth.2 4 Indeed, the
Pennsylvania court's requirement that the purpose of such laws be
legitimate and its conclusion that exclusionary purposes are imper-
missible, is consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in Shapiro.
Part I of the Court's lengthy opinion in Shapiro, which in later
cases has not received the attention given to the compelling state
interest language of Part IV, dealt at length with the purposes of the
state legislation under attack. In Part III the Court stated that
"exclusion from the jurisdiction of the poor . . .was the specific
objective""' of the challenged provisions. Using language not incon-
sistent with a view of the right to travel as a part of due process
liberty, the Court noted that "the nature of our Federal Union and
our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that
ll citizens be free to travel . . .uninhibited by statutes, rules, or
regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement."'2 "
A law having no other purpose than to inhibit the exercise of a funda-
mental right has a constitutionally impermissible purpose. 12 Thus,
local ordinances are not permissible which have as their sole purpose
the exclusion of new residents. It is conceivable that some types of
laws will be found patently unconstitutional because of their wholly
exclusionary purposes. For example, absent strong evidence to the
contrary, an exclusionary purpose may be clear where statutory
schemes place a "cap" on growth rates or ultimate population levels,
but not at all clear where regulations are designed to "insure that the
municipal services which the community requires are provided in an
orderly and rational manner."'2
Once it is established that the purpose of an ordinance does not
render it patently unconstitutional, the law must meet the height-
ened rationality standard which requires that, in addition to being
otherwise rational, it not be inconsistent with regional patterns of
"21d. at 661, 107 S.E.2d at 396.
123419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
121215 A.2d at 612, quoted in text at note 38 supra.
''394 U.S. at 628 (emphasis added).
'281d. at 629 (emphasis added).
'21id. at 631.
'2 National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597, 612 (1965).
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natural growth. Through this requirement that protection of the in-
terests of future residents is achieved without total nullification of the
localities' ability to plan for future growth,' 9 and irrespective of the
identity of the parties to the litigation.'30 As was said in National
Land, "[z]oning is a means by which a governmental body can plan
for the future-it may not be used as a means to deny the fu-
ture. . . .Zoning provisions may not be used. . . to avoid the in-
creased responsibilities and economic burdens which time and natu-
ral growth invariably bring.'
3'
Under the regional standard a town in its land use plans must not
only make reasonable accommodation for the amount of natural
growth expected, but it must also provide for balanced growth. A plan
which fails to meet this latter requirement by not providing for all
reasonable residential uses does not rationally promote the general
welfare.' 32 Thus, an ordinance which excludes smaller homes or lot
sizes, '3 apartments,'34 or low-cost housing'35 without substantial justi-
fication will be invalidated.3 On the other hand, a plan for balanced
12'See, e.g., Comment, 32 U. Prrr. L. REv. 83 (1970); Comment, 25 VAND. L. REv.
466 (1972).
'30In a subsequent case the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated: "Although
National Land, and this problem in general, is postured as involving the constitutional
due process rights of the land-owner whose property has been zoned adversely to his
best interests, it cannot realistically be detached from the rights of other people desir-
ous of moving into the area. . . ." Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268
A.2d 765, 768 n.6 (1970); accord, e.g., Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town of Ramapo, 30
N.Y.2d 359, 375, 285 N.E.2d 291, 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 149, appeal dismissed, 409
U.S. 1003 (1972).
'1'215 A.2d at 610 (emphasis added). See, e.g., Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Town-
ship of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353, 357 (1971) ("The test must be
whether it promotes reasonably a balanced and well ordered plan for the entire munici-
pality."); Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 375, 285 N.E.2d
291, 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 149, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
132See Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
' Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d
353 (1971); Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
''Westwood Forest Estates, Inc. v. Village of S. Nyack, 23 N.Y.2d 424, 244 N.E.2d
700, 297 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1969); Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
'1Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 7 Pa. Cmwlth. 453, 300 A.2d
107 (1973).
13'See also, e.g.-, Kavanewsky v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 160 Conn. 397, 279 A.2d
567 (1971). It should be noted that the ordinance upheld in Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, - U.S. _, 94 S. Ct. 1536 (1974) did exclude all multi-family dwellings
from the village. However, because Belle Terre "'is a village on Long Island's north
shore of about 220 homes inhabited by 700 people" whose "total land area is less than
one square mile," id. at 1537, it is unlikely that the effect of such a law would be
contrary to regional rationality. Indeed, Belle Terre's status points up the inadequacy
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growth in accordance with regional demands will enjoy the tradi-
tional presumption of validity but may be invalidated if shown to be
unreasonable.
1 3 7
The actions which may be taken without unreasonably thwarting
balanced patterns of demographic growth may in part be determined
by the natural demand for housing in the region. Enactments which
would be found irrational in an area being engulfed by urban sprawl,
therefore, may be at least temporarily permissible in a locality where
little or no natural growth is anticipated. In Steel Hill Development,
Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 131 for example, factual findings of severe
sewage disposal and pollution problems justified, as a stop-gap meas-
ure, an ordinance drastically restricting development.'39 In distin-
guishing the results reached in other cases employing a regional stan-
dard of heightened rationality, the court said:
All these cases refer to an unnatural limiting of suburban ex-
pansion into towns in the path of population growth where a
too restrictive view of the general welfare was taken ...
[A]ppellant here does not seek to satisfy an already existing
demand for suburban expansion, but rather seeks to create a
demand in Sanbornton on behalf of wealthy residents of Mega-
lopolis . . . . These different problems of suburban and rural
expansion, their scientific and legal analyses, and their appro-
priate solutions cannot so easily be equated. 4"
Thus, in areas of low natural demand, regulatory measures taken for
of per se rules, since an ordinance which would be "irrational" (with respect to multi-
family dwellings) in larger communities may not be so in a small community already
filled with single family dwellings, where it will have virtually no regional impact.
"'Colonial Park for Mobile Homes, Inc. v. New Britain Borough Zoning Hearing
Bd., 5 Pa. Cmwlth. 594, 290 A.2d 719 (1972); Zelvin v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 30 Conn.
Sup. 157, 306 A.2d 151 (C.P. Hartford County 1973).
131469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972).
'3 Were we to adjudicate this as a restriction for all time, and were the
evidence of pressure from land-deprived and land-seeking outsiders
more real, we might well come to a different conclusion. Where there
is natural population growth it has to go somewhere. . . and in that
case we do not think it should be channelled by the happenstance of
what town gets its veto in first. But, at this time of uncertainty as to
the right balance between ecological and population pressures, we
cannot help but feel that the town's ordinance, which severly restricts
development, may properly stand for the present as a legitimate stop-
gap measure.
Id. at 962.
111d. at 961 (emphasis added).
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aesthetic and historical'4' purposes will be accorded greater deference
in the context of regional rationality, since those purposes may in
such areas be more easily reconciled with the responsibility of accom-
modating anticipated growth.'
While protecting the interests of potential residents, the regional
rationality standard would allow reasonable deviations from the nat-
ural growth rate of the area. A deviation would probably be consid-
ered reasonable if it does not drastically impede or divert anticipated
growth, if it is supported by sound planning designed to meet real and
substantial problems, and if it would alter natural growth rates only
as long as is necessary to alleviate such problems and institute a
master plan for the rational and orderly accommodation of growth.
For example, in Golden v. Planning Board of Town of Ramapo,'43 the
town's uncontested allegations of inadequate facilities and soundly
planned scheme for sequential growth met the intensified rationality
standard, and a land use ordinance which placed temporary restric-
tions on the development of some property within the municipality
was upheld.'
That the considerations which appear in land use decisions em-
ploying a regional or heightened rationality standard are numerous
and complex cannot be denied. It is precisely because of their number
"'See County Comm'r v. Miles, 246 Md. 355, 228 A.2d 450 (1967) (five-acre mini-
mum lot size upheld in historically significant area of a rural county):
Fairfax County was in the midst of a population explosion and East-
town Township [National Land] was in the path of one. The popula-
tion of Queen Anne's County is small and is not expected to increase
... [significantly] . . . in the next ten years .... [T]he many
historical sites in Queen Anne's had no counterpart in Carper and
Kohn .... [T]he experts . . .agreed that the preservation of such
sites is a proper criterion in zoning .... [Tihe ordinance makes fair
and reasonable provision for all the different kinds of housing required
in the County . . .That a zoning ordinance endeavors to shape the
future within the general framework of existing conditions does not
render it arbitrary or unreasonable.
Id. at 458 (emphasis added).
"'Compare Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir.
1972), and County Comm'r of Queene Anne's County v. Miles, 246 Md. 355, 228 A.2d
450 (1967), with, e.g., National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597
(1965).
"330 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed 409 U.S.
1003 (1972).
'Petaluma, on the other hand, placed a flat numerical limit on annual develop-
ment, which created a great disparity between natural demand and actual growth. See
note 9 supra. Significantly, developers in Ramapo could proceed with construction at
any time if they paid for the necessary public services themselves. Thus, there was not
an absolute ban on growth beyond specified limits, as there was in Petaluma.
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and complexity that judicial protection of the interests involved
should not be undertaken by application of an overly simplistic stan-
dard of review which might seriously undermine some legitimate in-
terests in the process of vindicating others. Although an exhaustive
listing of the potentially relevant considerations may never be possi-
ble, since new factors may arise in different factual settings, it is
suggested that the following considerations should be addressed by
courts in evaluating the constitutionality of land use laws: (1)
whether either the expressed purpose of the ordinance is patently
exclusionary, or its effect is so patently exclusionary as to permit the
conclusive finding of an impermissible purpose; (2) if the purpose is
permissible, whether the ordinance significantly reduces the growth
rate below levels prevailing in the region;' (3) whether the munici-
pality enacting the ordinance is in a region undergoing rapid natural
growth, or facing an imminent and substantial increase in its rate of
natural growth; (4) whether the deviation, if any, from the natural
growth rate is supported by sound planning designed to meet real and
substantial problems; 4 ' (5) whether the deviation from natural
growth rates is temporary, constituting part of a coordinated regula-
tory plan for the rational and orderly accommodation of growth;'47 (6)
whether legitimate public interest in preservation of truly historic or
scenic areas weighs in favor of sustaining the ordinance; 4 ' (7) whether
"'A drastic reduction may of course be a consideration in a finding that the
purpose of the ordinance is impermissible. The proper size for the "region" is basically
a common sense determination. Consideration of growth rates of adjoining communi-
ties or unincorporated areas would seem proper.
"'Documentary evidence, such as master plans and studies, may take on a great
deal of importance in this area. To the extent that such studies and plans are genuinely
helpful to localities such a development would not be undesirable. Their absence
should not doom an ordinance, unless there are ample indications that its enactment
was "otherwise irrational." That is, courts should try to prevent the development of a
situation where a statute's fate is determined by the mere absence or presence of
impressive studies and plans, since there will undoubtedly arise situations in which
ordinances are clearly necessary and such documentary undertakings would constitute
unnecessary burdens on municipal taxpayers, and other situations where ordinances
should be invalidated in spite of voluminous documentary support.
"'This consideration is of course also relevant to the initial determination of pur-
pose.
" 8Currently the majority rule is that aesthetic considerations alone will not justify
the exercise of the police power for zoning purposes but that they may be given due
weight along with other factors. The trend, however, is apparently toward the view that
aesthetic considerations alone are sufficient justification for such laws. Zoning for
aesthetic purposes has gained increasing acceptance since the Supreme Court in Ber-
man v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), said that the concept of the "public welfare"
includes aesthetic as well as monetary values. Id. at 31. See Note, Aesthetic Zoning:
A Current Evaluation of the Law, 18 U. FLA. L. Rav. 430, 438 (1965). See also Agnor,
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the ordinance provides for all reasonable residential uses;'" and, (8)
whether the ordinance makes reasonable provision for other uses.15
By requiring consideration of these and other relevant factors, the
regional rationality standard is capable of protecting the rights of
property owners and potential residents, while simultaneously allow-
ing local governments to make rational plans for the assimilation of
growth.
Conclusion
In the Petaluma case an ordinance imposing a numerical limit on
yearly construction of housing units was invalidated under the strict
equal protection standard of scrutiny as violative of the right to travel
of potential future residents of the town of Petaluma. By applying the
travel doctrine of Shapiro v. Thompson to local land use laws, Petal-
uma establishes a precedent which could lead to the blanket invalida-
tion of virtually all such local laws. However, examination of Shapiro
and its progeny has indicated that the application of the right-to-
Beauty Begins a Comeback: Aesthetic Considerations in Zoning, 11 J. PuB. L. 260
(1962); Note, Zoning: Aesthetics: The Chameleon of Zoning, 4 TULSA L.J. 48 (1967);
Comment, Zoning, Aesthetics, and the First Amendment, 64 COLUM. L. Rav. 81 (1964).
A series of cases preserving the "Vieux Carre Ordinance," which sought to protect the
historic and architectural integrity of New Orleans' famous French Quarter, helped lay
the groundwork for acceptance of the idea that municipalities may rely upon a general
delegation of authority to sustain zoning for historical or aesthetic purposes. City of
New Orleans v. Levy, 223 La. 14, 64 So.2d 798 (1953); City of New Orleans v. Perga-
ment, 198 La. 852, 5 So.2d 129 (1941); City of New Orleans v. Impastato, 198 La. 206,
3 So.2d 559 (1941). See also Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 783, 128
N.E.2d 563 (1955) (preservation of Beacon Hill area of Boston); Opinion of the Justices
to the Senate, 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 (1955) (preservation of historic appear-
ance of Nantucket); City of Sante Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d
13 (1964) (upholding zoning seeking to preserve "Old Santa Fe Style" architecture).
I*'his is slightly repetitive as factor (5) mentions "rational and orderly" growth,
and the Pennsylvania courts, for example, have considered ordinances "irrational"
which do not provide for all reasonable residential uses. See notes 127-32 and accompa-
nying text supra. However, specific mention of this consideration is warranted because
exclusion of multiple-unit and low-income housing has been a favorite exclusionary
device in the past. See, e.g., Appeal of Girsch, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970) (zoning
scheme which failed to provide for apartments found unconstitutional). Additionally,
if exclusion of certain uses is found to constitute discrimination against a suspect class,
such as blacks seeking to move into low income housing, then scrutiny under current
equal protection standards may be appropriate. See, e.g., Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n
v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971);
Sisters of Providence v. City of Evanston, 335 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
15OSee, e.g., Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd., 425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d 169 (1967)
(in absence of evidence of harmful effects a township wide prohibition of quarrying is
invalid).
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